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The more economic approach has changed competition law, most notably in the field of 
vertical agreements, merger control and unilateral conduct. It is the latter area Wolfgang 
Wurmnest deals with in his Hamburg habilitation thesis. Whereas in the past the criterion of 
fairness prevailed, separating legal and illegal conduct according to the form of the behaviour 
in question, the effect on (consumer) welfare now has taken centre stage. Behaviour that was 
condemned in the past may prove beneficial today. The author analyses recent developments 
and pleads in favour of a more evolutionary than revolutionary interpretation of this 
development. He accepts taking into account efficiency on the level of justification but rejects 
the reduction of competition law's goals to efficiency and consumer welfare as the sole goal. 
Instead, he underlines the importance of the concept of economic freedom and of the process 
of rivalry between competing firms. Thus, he is in line with recent case law of the European 
Court of Justice according to which European competition law does not only pursue the 
immediate interests of consumers but has ‘to protect the structure of the market and thus 
competition as such’ (T-Mobile Netherlands, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited). The 
position of the author may be described as a ‘moderate’ effects based approach. The welfare 
effect is given broad space (even more in the scrutiny of specific problems than on the 
conceptual basis), but it is not the only and immediate goal of competition law. There is room 
for other goals, for example market integration in the EU/EEA internal market. 
The study is broadly conceived and includes the history of competition law in the USA, the 
European Union and in Germany with respect to unilateral conduct. Although the wording of 
Section 2 Sherman Act reflects the anti-monopolistic impetus of the past, it is long-
established in US antitrust law that only exclusionary conduct is covered. Hence, there is no 
fundamental difference to the concept of ‘abuse’ in European law. The author pleads in favour 
of the maintenance of market definition for the purpose of establishing dominance. He 
examines alternative concepts but does not see the time come for a direct determination of 
market power. The book does not only give a full account of the economics of competition 
law but makes a critical selection for the purpose of practical application. 
The author applies his general findings to two particular forms of exclusionary conduct, i.e. 
predatory pricing and fidelity rebates. Although predatory pricing is considered 
anticompetitive both in the US and the EU, the conditions for a competition law violation are 
different. The most prominent (but not the only) difference is Robert Bork's recoupment test 
which is required by US but not by European courts. In the US, plaintiffs have not only to 
show that the competitor's prices are below an appropriate measure of cost, but that there is a 
reasonable prospect of recouping losses in a foreseeable future. By contrast, the European 
Court of Justice renounces on a complete predation-recoupment story. It is sufficient to show 
prices below cost (with nuanced rules for prices under average variable and total costs; in 
single cases even prices above cost have been qualified abusive). The author points to the 
procedural reasons for this difference: In the US, the recoupment criterion serves as a filter 
against excessive law suits and allows keeping the jury out. In Europe, substantive law has not 
to respond to the risk of blackmail suits since the institutional setting is different. Therefore, it 
is sufficient to show plausibility of recoupment. 
As regards rebates, the author identifies over-inclusive enforcement in the EU. In his view, 
economic theory showing procompetitive effects of rebate schemes considered suspicious so 
far has to be given greater weight. The effects on competition have to be assessed more 
thoroughly without following US law completely. Whereas US law looks at rebates from the 
perspective of predatory pricing, European law takes into account the close relationship of 
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certain rebates with exclusive purchasing agreements. The author distinguishes different kinds 
of rebates and focuses on the most dangerous ones, especially retroactive rebates as opposed 
to functional or quantity discounts. He applies his results to specific cases, for example the 
Intel case. In its 2009 decision, the European Commission held that Intel's rebates were 
abusive since they foreclosed an as efficient competitor. According to the author, the decision 
of the General Court in the Intel case will depend on the question if a detailed price/cost-
analysis is necessary, and, if so, whether the dominant firm was able to estimate the 
contestable portion of its products without access to information in the hands of the 
competitor or of customers. It would have been interesting to have the author's view on 
related problems, for example on margin squeeze where a comparable transatlantic 
divergence exists. But it is understandable that the author prioritises predatory pricing and 
rebates which allows him an analytical depth unparalleled (not only) in German literature. 
The author most brilliantly reveals the inability of unrealistic, Chicago style thinking to grasp 
the harmful potential of exclusionary conduct. He warns against the pointed emphasis on the 
distinction between a form-based and an effects-based approach and against the absolutization 
of the welfare criterion. With this, he does not plead against taking into account efficiency 
arguments, but places them on the level of justification. This proposal has the advantage of 
maintaining legal certainty while allowing a thorough economic examination. At the same 
time, he underlines the deficiencies of current approaches which – in his view – give static 
welfare maximization undue preference over a dynamic perspective. One could add that 
traditional approaches have neglected the dimension of time even more and that effects-based 
thinking has brought significant progress in this respect. An example is the relationship 
between competition law and intellectual property rights (IPRs). According to older 
approaches, the application of competition law had to stop where the contents or the ‘specific 
subject matter’ of an IPR was affected. The effects-based approach has allowed overcoming 
this formal demarcation: It is no longer a priori accepted that the application of the abuse 
prohibition to IPRs stifles innovation. Instead, an overall assessment has to be made taking 
into account the impact of competition law application on incentives to innovate not only of 
the right holder himself but also of follow-on innovators. These reflections show that it would 
not be justified reproaching the more economic approach for giving undue preference to static 
thinking. Instead, an encompassing view of the entire legal and economic context will have to 
include to a large extent the dimension of time. The need of legal certainty has to be satisfied 
by distinguishing groups of cases and by establishing check-lists indicating as precisely as 
possible the thin line between abuse and competition on the merits. 
Of special importance for this and other contexts is Frank H. Easterbrook's error cost 
framework. The author warns against the unbalanced consideration of type 1 errors (false 
positives) and calls for taking duly into account the risk of false negatives. Thus, he unveils 
the dangerous tendency of the error cost approach to underestimate the chilling effect of 
under-enforcement. Less persuasive is the recommendation against economists on the bench. 
If we trust lawyers to understand economic theories why not trust economists to understand 
the law? As the French example shows (with a leading scholar of industrial organization 
sitting in the Cour de cassation) – and in conformity with a forgotten recommendation in the 
Spaak report – greater diversity in the courts may prove extremely fruitful. 
The book provides a profound and masterly written analysis not only of unilateral restraints 
but also of the relationship between law and economics (including game theory, new 
institutional, experimental and behavioural economics) in competition policy. It is not 
possible to trace the numerous ramifications here. A coherent framework with practical 
recommendations is given. The specific proposals focus on European competition law. In 
addition, the book gives valuable advice for a reform of German law on unilateral restraints: 
The author welcomes the existence of stricter rules on the national level but proposes to create 
a more coherent system. The study is not restricted to substantive law but integrates the 
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overall context. Particularly impressive is the recurrent reference to institutional differences 
on both sides of the Atlantic, especially the tempering effect of private (over-)enforcement in 
the US on the definition of anti-competitive behaviour. The main subject is embedded in a 
particularly rich context. Based on a multi-faceted approach including the historical, political 
and comparative dimension, the author does not content himself with giving theoretical 
answers, but proposes solutions adapted to the institutional setting in Europe. His inquiry 
illustrates most vividly that identical problems do not necessarily require identical solutions in 
the world. Thus, Wolfgang Wurmnest demonstrates most convincingly how competition law 
has to adapt to profound changes in economic analysis without giving up the systemic 
autonomy of law. 
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